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BACKGROUND 
 
After several years of gradual rapprochement 
and pragmatic engagement, EU-Belarus 
relations hit rock-bottom after rigged 
presidential election in December 2010 and 
the subsequent violent crackdown of 
opposition protests by the Belarusian regime. 
The ensuing ‘cold war’ between the West and 
Belarus reached its peak in February/March 
2012. In response to the extension of EU 
sanctions, the Lukashenka regime had 
requested the Polish and European Union 
ambassadors to leave the country. All EU 
member states then recalled their 
ambassadors to Minsk. Rather than moving 
closer to the EU, Belarus currently appears to 
drift towards closer relations with the Russian 
Federation. Following the economic crisis 
which hit Belarus in 2011 - the worst since its 
independence in 1991 - the country’s 
managed economy is more than ever 
depended on Russia for the provision of loans, 
subsidies on energy supply, and access to the 
regional market. The parliamentary elections 
in Belarus on 23 September 2012 are a test for 
the success of the EU’s sanctions policy, but 
also for the future course of EU-Belarus 
relations: Quo Vadis Belarus, and where next 
for EU policy towards Belarus?  
 
 
 
 
 
Belarus’ financial crisis:  Severe, but not 
severe enough for political change? 
 
The economic crisis which hit Belarus in March 
2011 put considerable pressure on the 
Lukashenka government, which tries to 
balance liberalising the economy to avoid 
bankruptcy on the one hand, and the 
Belarusian ‘social model’ which sustains the 
power of the government.  
 
Following the completion of the IMF program 
in Belarus in March 2010, the Belarusian 
government immediately relaxed its monetary 
and fiscal policies, mainly in view of the 
presidential elections in December 2010. 
Large loans were offered to the industrial 
sector, and wages and pensions were 
increased by up to 50%. As a result inflation 
increased. The development was not 
necessarily a new phenomenon for the 
Belarusian economy, but the additional 
increase of the trade deficit and further 
depletion of foreign currency reserves, 
coupled with relatively fixed exchange rates, 
led to a serious monetary crisis. The financial 
difficulties of the Belarusian government were 
exacerbated by the decision of Russian state-
owned gas monopoly Gazprom to increase the 
price of natural gas supplied to Belarus from 
150 USD per 1,000 cubic metres of gas in 
2009, to 169.20 USD in the first quarter of 
2010 and 184.80 USD in the second quarter.  
 
To tackle the trade deficit and the high 
inflation, the Belarusian government 
responded with some ad hoc measures 
throughout 2011 (fixed prices for select 
products, increased interest rates and 
restrictions on foreign currency exchange). In 
November 2011 Gazprom agreed to sell 
natural gas to Belarus at 60% below the price 
charged to other European countries. In 
return, Gazprom increased its ownership of 
Belarusian gas pipeline company Beltransgaz 
from 50% to 100%. Belarus received 2.5 billion 
USD from the sale of Beltransgaz in November 
2011, a further 440 million USD loan from the 
Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEc) and 
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a 1 billion USD loan from the Russian Sberbank 
in December 2011. In June 2012, Belarus 
received the additional 880 million USD as the 
third tranche of the EurAsEc loan.1 
 
The inflow of fresh capital in conjunction with 
the ad hoc measures taken by the Belarusian 
regime helped to stabilise the economy, albeit 
temporarily. In April 2012 Standard & Poor's 
(S&P’s) Ratings Services revised the sovereign 
credit ratings outlook for Belarus from 
‘negative’ to ‘stable’. According to S&P’s, the 
ratings on Belarus do, however, remain 
constrained by political risks, high government 
financing needs, reliance on external funding, 
and the government's reluctance to introduce 
structural reforms to improve the country's 
competitiveness and growth prospects.2  
 
The pressure on the Belarusian government to 
introduce more substantial structural 
economic reforms is indeed increasing, as is its 
dependence on foreign loans to repay old 
dept. Although the loans from Russia keep the 
state-managed economy afloat for now, 
Lukashenka still needs additional loans to 
finance his plans to raise the salaries of 
Belarusians to pre-crisis levels by the end of 
2012. However, in 2011, the IMF concluded 
that no further loans would be issued to 
Belarus. Although the IMF has formally no 
political mandate, it is clear that its latest 
decisions were made in consideration of the 
human rights situation in the country, rather 
than the fulfilment of economic pre-
conditions for the loan.3 The refusal of the 
IMF to grant a loan to Belarus is thus likely to 
have some impact on Lukashenka's ability to 
improve his ratings among the general 
population prior to the parliamentary 
elections in September 2012.  
 
The crisis also weakened Belarusian industry 
and put considerable pressure on private 
households. Belarusian citizens suffered most 
                                                 
1 BelarusDigest. Russian Subsidies Are Not Enough: 
Belarus Seeks a New IMF Loan, 7 February 2012: 
http://belarusdigest.com. 
2The full text is available at:  
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/05/30/idUSWNA8
33920120530. 
3 Interview by the author with EEAS official, November 
2011. 
from the inflation and Belarusian enterprises 
forced over 600.000 employees (13% of the 
total workforce) to take temporary leave.4 
Belarusian households affected by the crisis 
already borrow more money informally than 
households anywhere else in Eastern Europe 
and Central Asia.5 Consumer prices are set to 
rise by a further 35.5% in 2012, which is hardly 
a decrease from the 41% increase in prices in 
2011.6 This explains why Lukashenka is still 
very reluctant to allow larger scale 
privatisation and foreign direct investment, 
which could result in labour redundancies - 
despite the past pressure from the IMF and 
the conditionality of the Russian loans, the 
Belarusian regime has been very successful in 
delaying the privatisation of key state assets. 
 
Privatisation will, however, become 
increasingly harder to avoid in the future. 
Belarus is now part of the Single Economic 
Space (SES) with Russia and Kazakhstan. After 
Russian accession to the WTO, Belarusian 
exports within the SES will face harsh 
competition and are likely to decrease 
significantly. Belarusian producers will also 
face more competition inside Belarus due to 
an increase in imports of goods from the third 
countries via Russia and Kazakhstan via the 
Customs Union and the SES. The Belarusian 
regime might have little choice but to start 
serious negotiations on its WTO accession to 
avoid painful economic losses, which will in 
turn force the regime to introduce economic 
reforms. 
 
Civil Society in Belarus: Potential for political 
change?  
 
Prior to the 2010 presidential elections, the 
Belarusian authorities allowed some 
independent civil society activity. Between 
August 2008 and December 2010, very few 
political activists were imprisoned on political 
grounds, and (pro-Western) civil society 
                                                 
4 Forbrig, J. “Abgewirtschaftet: Europas letzter Diktator 
ringt um den Machterhalt. Belarus-Analysen,  1, 25 May 
2011: p. 2. 
5 European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. 
Transition Report, London: EBRD, 2011: p. 50. 
6 International Monetary Fund. World Economic 
Outlook: Slowing Growth, Rising Risks. September 2011: 
p. 38. 
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started to cooperate and institutionalise 
under the umbrella of the EU’s Eastern 
Partnership Civil Society Forum (CSF).  
 
But although the Belarusian government’s 
pressure on independent NGOs somewhat 
decreased in the year proceeding the 
presidential election, the actual opportunities 
and freedom of manoeuvre of NGOs critical of 
the government did not change 
fundamentally. The Belarusian authorities 
took, for example, several repressive 
measures against the Speak the Truth 
Campaign, the Union of Poles in Belarus, as 
well as the Union of Belarusian Writers. In the 
course of 2010, the Speak the Truth Campaign 
constituted a particular problem for the 
regime as it gained widespread support from 
the population on local actions (e.g. 
unemployment or local infrastructure 
improvements). Local officials are also 
reported to have taken a friendly attitude to 
the actions of the Speak the Truth Campaign.  
From March 2010, the authorities began to 
confiscate documents, PCs and even private 
savings from Speak the Truth campaigners, 
and searched the group’s offices and private 
apartments. 
 
Nevertheless, the violent crackdown on the 
opposition protests to the 2010 presidential 
elections still came as a surprise to many civil 
society activists and the political opposition. 
Over 700 opposition activists were arrested, at 
least 57 charged and prosecuted, and 29 
sentenced to prison/labour camp terms by 
Belarusian courts. In June 2012, at least 13 
activists remain in prison on political grounds. 
The crackdown weakened the political 
opposition. Its leading representatives were 
either imprisoned or fled abroad. 
Nevertheless, several protest movements 
continued (or developed) throughout 
2011/12, such as the 'Revolution through 
Social Networks' which in the summer 2011 
brought thousands of silent 'clapping' 
protesters to the streets, or the ‘Stop-Benzin’ 
campaign which paralysed traffic through 
central Minsk and attracted the attention of 
many ordinary Belarusians. In response, the 
Lukashenka regime introduced new legislation 
further restricting the right of assembly and 
foreign financing of civil society organisations. 
In summer 2012, young activists increasingly 
became the target of political repression, as 
well as politically ‘moderate’ think tanks, 
which had hitherto been tolerated by the 
regime.  
 
The record of the EaP Civil Society Forum is 
also rather mixed. After several years of its 
existence, the actual powers and influence of 
the CSF remain limited, or, in the words of an 
NGO representative, the CSF is regarded as 
the 'kindergarden' by the government officials 
in the regional thematic platforms of the EaP.7 
Belarusian NGOs involved in the CSF do 
nevertheless see some indirect benefits of the 
platform because it encourages coordination 
among Belarusian civil society.8  
 
In parallel to the National Platform of the EaP 
Civil Society Forum, another group of 
Belarusian NGOs initiated the Public Advisory 
Council, which was aimed to foster 
interactions between civil society and the 
state, yet under the patronage of state 
institutions. Whereas most of the Belarusian 
civil society organisations involved in the EaP 
national platform are pro-European and strive 
for independence from the regime, those in 
favour of the Public Advisory Council seek to 
work with the state.9 These two different 
positions towards the state and the EU have 
caused a significant split in among Belarusian 
civil society, which appears difficult to 
reconcile in the near future.  
 
Equally concerning are cleavages in the young 
generation of Belarusians. On the one hand, a 
fairly heterogeneous cluster of independent 
civil society groups (e.g. 'Malady Front', 
'Maladaya Belarus', 'Moladz BNF') is made up 
of pro-Western and pro-Europe oriented 
young people, who use the internet, speak 
foreign languages and have often been 
abroad. It was this group of young people who 
initiated the 'Revolution through Social 
Networks' which was organised through the 
social network 'Vkontakte'. On the other hand, 
                                                 
7 Interview by the author with Belarusian participants of 
the CSF, June 2010. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Fedotova, I. and Belovsky, V. ‘Civil Society: 
Hyperactivity with a view to future performance.’ 
Belarusian Yearbook 2010. Vilnius, 2011: pp. 133-149. 
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young people are organised in the 
government-sponsored and pro-governmental 
organisation Belarussian Republic Youth 
Union, which offers a wide range of benefits 
to its members, ranging from free tickets for 
concerts and cinemas to employment 
opportunities.10  
 
In addition, the number of Belarusian civil 
society organisations abroad is further 
expanding, they have become more difficult to 
network and as a result, they also often lack 
trust in the activities and motivations of each 
other.  
 
Belarusian society: Potential for political 
change? 
 
Many commentators interpreted the public 
protests following the 2010 presidential 
elections as a 'true and honest middle class 
that forms the basis of democracy', and a sign 
that Belarusian civil culture was developing 
from an atomised society into a civil one.11 
And indeed, recent polls among the Belarusian 
population suggest that two thirds of 
Belarusians believe that their country is 
heading in the wrong direction, and over 60 
percent hold President Lukashenka 
responsible for the current economic crisis of 
the country.12  
 
Moreover, Lukashenka's ratings have dropped 
from 53% in December 2010 to just 20.5% in 
September 2011. According to IISEPS's past 
surveys, this marks the lowest rating of 
Lukashenka since he took office in 1994. Yet, 
whereas the ratings of Lukashenka have 
decreased significantly, the ratings of the 
opposition candidates remained largely 
unchanged. In other words, there is certainly a 
growing frustration among society with the 
                                                 
10 Kapustina, O. and Bosse, G. ‘Civil Society and young 
people in Belarus: A force for political change or ‘silent 
majority’? Options for EU Polic.’ Policy Brief for the 
Roundtable Conference: Democracy promotion East and 
South after the Arab Spring, TEPSA/Maastricht 
University/IEP, Brussels, 1/2 December 2011: p. 5.  
11 Silitski, V. ‘Requiem for a dialogue.’ Belarusian 
Institute for Strategic Studies, 13 January 2011: p. 2. 
12 Independent Institute of Socio-Economic and Political 
Studies, September 2011: http://www.iiseps.org.  
current president, but a convincing alternative 
is missing, too.  
 
In the September 2011 poll, 28% of 
Belarusians saw themselves in opposition to 
the current government, which was 10 
percent more than in December 2010 (18%), 
though still far from the majority. The majority 
of Belarusians has, however, heard of the 
'Revolution through Social Networks' and the 
silent protest campaign (70%). Only 20% 
stated that they disapproved of the initiatives, 
37% approved the campaigns and one third 
was 'indifferent'. The support for civil society 
initiatives is therefore relatively high, 
compared to the low ratings of the opposition 
candidates, though few Belarusians indicated 
that they are directly involved in the protest 
campaigns (7%). 
 
The picture of society-civil society relations in 
Belarus today is therefore rather complex. On 
the one hand, the number of civil society 
initiatives, and especially those led by the 
country's youth, is growing steadily, and so is 
their visibility to the Belarusian population at 
large. On the other hand, civil society in (and 
outside) Belarus is very heterogeneous in its 
goals and still lacks effective mechanisms 
inside the country through which it could gain 
greater visibility and popularity among the 
population. 
 
Is a popular uprising likely to occur in Belarus 
any time soon? Many observers are surprised 
by the resilience of the Belarusian population, 
especially since the current economic crisis 
drastically reduced the average living 
standard; even of those who were relatively 
well off before the economic crisis. The 
monthly average wage in Belarus currently 
ranges between 135-200 USD, with prizes for 
goods as high as in the EU27 (or higher).13  
 
Explanations range from the 'ethos of 
resilience' among the Belarusian population, 
to its 'self-sufficiency' throughout history, or 
the non-existence of a political public sphere 
                                                 
13 With the exception of 'essential' products such as milk 
or bread, or public transport costs, which are regulated 
by the state and therefore remain rather cheap. 
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and public discussions.14 A less intangible 
explanation is that an increasingly large 
number of young and highly educated 
Belarusians are leaving Belarus. As a result, 
they are less likely to take part in opposition 
protests inside Belarus for a lack of prospects 
or political freedoms. According to estimates, 
the number of new and officially registered 
Belarusian workers in Kiev and Moscow has 
increased by a third of a million since 1 
January 2011, and several EU programs 
finance scholarships at European universities 
for young Belarusians, many of whom often 
do not return to Belarus.15  
 
On the other hand, the level of support for 
democracy among the Belarusian population 
is in fact currently higher than in Moldova and 
Ukraine, and higher than in all ‘new’ EU 
member states (Chart 1).16 Therefore, and as 
the popular uprisings in the Arab world in 
2011/12 have demonstrated, the myth of a 
‘passive people’ or ‘lack of civil society’ in a 
country may at times be proven wrong, and 
should also not be assumed to be the case per 
se for Belarus. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
14 Zeit Online ‘Lukaschenkos Regime ist in Gefahr.’ 
Interview with Walerij Karbalewitsch, 11 November 
2011, available from: http://www.zeit.de.   
15 Pikulik, A. ‘Is the economic crisis a threat to the 
Lukasheno regime?’ BISS BLITZ, Belarusian Institute for 
Strategic Affairs, 1 November 2011. 
16 European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
‘Transition Report 2011.’ London: EBRD: p. 62. 
THE EU’s POLICY TOWARDS BELARUS: ‘MORE 
CRITICAL THAN ENGAGEMENT’? 
 
Since Lukashenka became the president of 
Belarus in 1994, the EU’s policy towards 
Belarus moved from a policy of isolation (from 
1996 onwards) to a policy of ‘critical 
engagement’ from 2008.17 EU officials 
describe the response of the Union to the 
violent crackdown of the opposition after the 
2010 presidential election as a move from 
‘more engagement than critical’ to ‘more 
critical than engagement’.18 EU policy towards 
Belarus after the election in 2010 is essentially 
based on two key pillars: (i) more targeted 
sanctions and (ii) more support for civil 
society. What are the pros and cons of this 
policy in practice and is it likely to affect 
political developments in Belarus? 
 
1. Restrictive measures: Targeted sanctions 
or political prisoners’ game? 
 
In response to the violations of human rights 
by the Belarusian regime in the aftermath of 
the 2010 presidential elections, the EU 
reactivated and broadened restrictive 
measures against Belarus. Between January 
2011 and June 2012, the EU designated almost 
250 individuals to a visa-ban and assets freeze, 
imposed an arms embargo and an assets 
freeze on 32 Belarusian companies. In its 
initial Decision of 31 January 2011, the Council 
targeted individuals responsible ‘for the 
violations of international electoral standards’ 
and the ‘crackdown on civil society and 
democratic opposition’. The range of 
individuals targeted by sanctions was 
significantly broadened one year later 
(January 2012) to include those responsible 
for ‘serious violations of human rights or the 
repression of civil society and democratic 
opposition in Belarus’ and ‘persons or entities 
benefiting from or supporting the Lukashenka 
                                                 
17 For a discussion see:  Bosse, G. ‘A Partnership with 
Dictatorship: Explaining the Paradigm Shift in European 
Union Policy towards Belarus.’ Journal of Common 
Market Studies 50, 3 (2012): pp. 367-384.  
18 Interviews by the author with EU officials in 
November/December 2011, Brussels. 
6 
 
regime’.19 The vast majority of targeted 
individuals are judges and prosecutors, as well 
as key personnel of the KGB and ministries.  
 
The use and impact of the sanctions is 
contested. On the one hand, there is a general 
consensus that targeted ‘smart’ sanctions are 
more effective and feasible than imposing a 
trade embargo.20 First, full-blown trade 
sanctions are likely to negatively affect the 
Belarusian population by targeting large state-
owned enterprises which would in turn result 
in large-scale redundancies. Second, the 
regime can survive a trade embargo (if not 
even consolidate) by diverting trade away 
from the EU towards the Single Economic 
Space with Russia and Kazakhstan. And third, 
EU member states are not likely to agree on 
an effective trade embargo because of vested 
economic interests (e.g. the Baltic states’ 
interest in joint ventures with/ investments in 
Belarusian companies). Moreover, senior EU 
officials appear to see smart sanctions as an 
effective means to signal to the public that the 
EU ‘is doing something’ in response to the 
violation of human rights, and is seen to be on 
‘the right side of history’, in particular in the 
context of the recent popular uprisings against 
the autocratic regimes in the Middle East and 
North Africa.21  
 
On the other hand, ‘smart sanctions’ raise a 
number of questions, especially considering 
that they have been dominating the EU’s 
policy towards Belarus over the past year.  
 
First, and crucially, the EU has not clearly 
defined the goal of the sanctions. Currently, 
the main the reason for the sanctions against 
individuals (the prosecution and 
imprisonment of political opponents) is 
equated with the goal of the sanctions (the 
release of all political prisoners). The EU has 
therefore moved away from its long-term 
                                                 
19 Council Decision 2010/639/CFSP of 25 October 2010 
concerning restrictive measures against Belarus, OJ L 
280, 26 October 2010, pp. 2-3. 
20 For a different point of view see: Marin, A. 
‘Sociological study on the composition of the Belarusian 
society.’ Study for the Directorate-General for External 
Policies of the Union, European Parliament, May 2012.  
21 Interviews by the author with EU officials in 
November/December 2011, Brussels. 
political demands pertaining to broader 
democratic reforms in Belarus. Instead, the EU 
is engaging once again in Lukashenka’s 
geopolitical game over political prisoners.22 By 
linking enhanced relations with the EU to the 
release of political prisoners, the Belarusian 
regime escapes the conditionality of 
democratic reform. It is also far from certain 
that the game will pay off for the EU: In 
September 2011 the regime agreed to release 
a number of political prisoners, yet most likely 
not because of EU sanctions, but following the 
visit of Bulgarian Foreign Minister Nickolay 
Mladenov, who negotiated the release.  
 
Second, the provision that smart sanctions can 
be invoked against any individual supporting 
the Lukashenka regime is very general and 
exposes the EU to criticism regarding a 
possible arbitrary application. In Belarus, 
thousands of individuals work for the state 
either directly or indirectly, and it is therefore 
exceptionally difficult to distinguish between 
supporters/non-supporters of the regime. The 
EU should thus also be very clear on the 
grounds upon which it places leading 
businessmen (and their companies) on the 
black-list, and justify why it views some more 
‘supportive’ of the regime than others. Third, 
EU member states and EU institutions should 
not to breach the sanctions regime. Several 
Belarusian officials were granted entry into EU 
member states, despite being subject to the 
visa ban.23 In addition, the European 
Commission itself may breach the provisions 
of the arms embargo towards Belarus by 
concluding contracts for the supply of night 
vision equipment for a new border 
management project.24 Such equipment can 
be used for internal repression and falls under 
the arms embargo.25 
                                                 
22 For a discussion see: Plaschinsky, G. ‘Political Prisoners 
in Belarus: How to Break the Vicious Circle.’ Belarus 
Digest, 20 February 2012. 
23 Charles, M. ‘The EU and Belarus: Sanctions? What 
Sanctions?’ EUobserver.com, 27 January 2012, available 
at: http://euobserver.com/7/115040.  
24 Contract forecast notice, Supplies: ‘Strengthening 
surveillance capacity on the “green” and “blue” border 
between the Republic of Belarus and Ukraine’, OJ/S S45, 
6 March 2012, 72505-2012. 
25 Articles 1a/b, Council Regulation 588/2011 of 20 June 
2011, and Annex III: ‘List of equipment which might be 
used for internal repression’, point 7: p. 6. 
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2. Support for civil society: Democracy vs. 
Modernisation? 
 
The EU was very quick to condemn the 
Belarusian for the violation of international 
electoral standards and human rights after the 
presidential elections in 2010. In its review of 
the ENP of May 2012, the Commission 
concludes that the EU had ‘strengthened its 
engagement with civil society, the political 
opposition and the public at large’. It 
redirected ‘major parts’ of its assistance for 
Belarus to civil society which led to a 
‘significant increase’ of its support for civil 
society.26 Yet, although the new emphasis on 
civil society by the EU was well-received by 
the political opposition in Belarus, doubts 
remain over the implementation of the new 
support for civil society in 2012/13 in practice.  
 
First, funds for the two principal instruments 
through which the EU supports civil society in 
Belarus in fact decrease from 2011 to 2012. 
The support for non-state actors (NSAs) via 
the ‘Non-State Actors and Local Authorities in 
Development Program’ (which includes funds 
from the Civil Society Facility) was reduced by 
more than half from €3.9 million in 2011 to 
just €2 million for 2012 and 2013.27 The funds 
available for civil society via the Country-
Based Support Scheme of the European 
Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights 
(EIDHR) will double from €0.5 million in 2011 
to €1.1 million in 2012.28 An additional €6 
million is made available for students’ mobility 
and youth language courses in 2011-2013.29 In 
total, however, funding for NSAs and via the 
EIDHR for civil society will decrease from an 
average of €6.4 million in 2011 to €4.1 million 
in 2012.  
 
                                                 
26 For example: Joint Staff Working Document 
‘Implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy 
in 2011.’ Regional Report: Eastern Partnership, 15 May 
2012: SWD(2012) 112 final: p. 3. 
27 Allocations of funding stated in the National Indicative 
Programme for Belarus (NIP) 2012-13 (p. 23) are 
indicative, actual allocations and budget lines appear in 
the respective project calls: For NSA&LA Actions in 
Belarus see the calls: EuropeAid/131655/L/ACT/BY 
(2011) and EuropeAid/132809/L/ACT/BY (2012-13). 
28 EIDHR call: EuropeAid/130756/L/ACT/BY (2010-11). 
29 NIP 2012-13, p. 23. 
Second, the National Indicative Programme 
(NIP) for Belarus for 2012/13 clearly places an 
emphasis on capacity-building of public 
authorities rather than the capacity-building 
of civil society. The Country Strategy Paper for 
Belarus (2007-13) still foresaw the ‘support for 
the development of democracy’ and ‘social 
and economic development’ and placed a 
special emphasis on increased capacities of 
civil society and professional organisations.30 
The NIP 2012/13, however, clearly prioritises 
modernisation and good governance, and in 
particular improving the capacity of public 
institutions to manage privatisation and 
investment processes, and to introduce 
reforms to establish and functioning market 
economy.31 Just one priority focuses on 
developing more effective institutions 
guaranteeing democracy and respect for 
human rights, though it appears that the 
emphasis of EU technical assistance in 2012 is 
on the implementation of sector programmes 
such as for energy, transport or the 
environment.32 
 
Third, the EU has, in practice, ruled out 
supporting Belarusian civil society at large. 
Speaking at the European Parliament in 
January 2012, the Head of the EU’s delegation 
in Minsk, Maira Mora, made it clear that her 
office had no intention of adopting a broader 
'sector approach' to engage with Belarusian 
civil society.33 The rather narrow definition of 
civil society by the EU will most likely further 
decrease the levels of interest in and 
awareness of the EU among ordinary 
Belarusians.  According to the latest opinion 
polls, the support for Russia is now 10% higher 
than support for the EU.34 In the past decade, 
levels of support for integration with the EU 
always exceeded support for integration with 
Russia. The EU’s latest initiatives for civil 
                                                 
30 ENPI, Belarus, Country Strategy Paper 2007-2013.  
31 NIP 2012-13, pp. 15-16. 
32 NIP 2012-13, p. 13; Contract forecast notice, Services: 
‘Capacity development facility to support the 
implementation of sector programmes under the ENPI 
annual action programmes for Belarus”, OJ/S S106, 6 
June 2012, 175759-2012. 
33 Meeting of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the 
European Parliament, 12 January 2012, available at: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/ep-live/EN/committees.  
34 Independent Institute of Socio-Economic and Political 
Studies, March 2012: http://www.iiseps.org. 
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society, such as the European Endowment for 
Democracy, or the European Dialogue on 
Modernization with Belarusian Society seem 
to point in the same direction – they almost 
exclusively involve leading figures of the 
political opposition and the larger (and often 
pro-European) Belarusian think tanks closely 
networked with EU institutions in Brussels.  
 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
1. Targeted sanctions require clear criteria: 
As long as Belarusian authorities, prosecutors, 
judges and security forces continue to violate 
international electoral standards and 
participate in the crackdown on civil society 
and democratic opposition, the EU should 
continue to place the involved individuals on 
its visa-black list. Sanctions should only be 
applied to persons supporting the Lukashenka 
regime more generally, if the EU establishes 
clear criteria for which actions/situations 
count as support and which do not. Placing 
entrepreneurs on the visa-black list simply 
because they feature on the ranking of the 
200 most successful Belarusian businessmen, 
should not be the way forward and would lead 
to accusations of an arbitrary application of 
EU sanctions.35 In turn, the authority of the 
EU’s sanctions could be undermined, and the 
EU might in fact loose several of its potential 
‘allies’ in the quest to push Lukashenka to 
introduce liberal market reforms.36    
 
2. Targeted sanctions should not be 
circumvented: It is of course important that 
the EU continues to ensure that it speaks ‘with 
one voice’ on Belarus. However, compared to 
EU policy towards other authoritarian 
regimes, such as Libya or Iran for example, its 
policy towards Belarus has by and large been 
fairly unified over the past decades. What 
should (and could) be avoided, however, are 
instances in which member states and EU 
                                                 
35 Ibid.: Belarusians believe that the authorities (34.9%) 
and law enforcement bodies (11.3%) are violating 
human rights in Belarus. Businessmen were not 
mentioned in response to the open question of who was 
violating human rights in Belarus the most. 
36For a different point of view see: Korosteleva, J. 
‘Impact of targeted sanctions on Belarus.’ Study for the 
Directorate-General for External Policies of the Union, 
European Parliament, May 2012.  
institutions attempt to circumvent their own 
sanctions regime, such as purchasing dual-use 
equipment for border assistance projects.  
 
3. More projects with civil society at large: 
Several of the EU’s recently funded projects, 
for example the ‘Belarus-EU Task Force’, are 
indeed designed to engage with a broader 
range of civil society groups in Belarus (e.g. 
higher education, regional development, and 
SME).37 Besides supporting the political 
opposition/ independent political elites in 
Belarus, the EU should also strategically target 
and develop the capacity civil society in other 
sectors over a sustained period of time (new 
program/budget line). The Civil Society Facility 
could be used for that purpose in the current 
financial term (until 2013), but then it should 
function as a top-up to existing programs with 
a clear definition of the target group, rather 
than a means to disguise the reduction of 
funding in existing programs, as is the case 
with the Non-State Actors support in 2012/13. 
Only ‘real’ projects with substance and a 
broader reach increase the visibility of the EU 
among Belarusians, not projects which solely 
aim at increasing EU visibility. 
 
4. Making ‘critical engagement’ work: The 
EU’s engagement with Belarus’ authorities is 
certainly controversial. There is no automatic 
guarantee that it leads to a socialisation of 
officials towards democracy, or that economic 
modernisation will lead to political reforms. 
However, if the EU does place a greater 
emphasis on capacity-building of Belarus’ 
public administration in 2012/13, efforts 
should be made to implement meaningful 
assistance projects that offer targeted and 
hands-on training to Belarusian officials by 
practitioners with long-term experience in the 
field and with a high level of knowledge of the 
country.  At the same time, the projects 
should take into account the new EU Strategic 
Framework on Human Rights and Democracy, 
and use all available diplomatic/strategic 
windows of opportunity to voice concerns 
                                                 
37 For additional details on the project see: 
http://democraticbelarus.eu/news/clearing-house-
project.  
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over and negotiate steps towards democratic 
reform in Belarus.38 
 
5. No unnecessary large-scale loans: In the 
short term, the Belarusian economy is likely to 
stabilise and further EU economic sanctions or 
the withdrawal of its (limited) ENPI financial 
assistance from Belarus will have no 
significant effect on the Belarusian economy, 
in particular taking into account the large 
increase in trade turnover between the EU 
and Belarus in 2011/12. The granting of a new 
IMF loan, for example, would have allowed 
Lukashenka to take more costly measures to 
improve his popularity ratings among the 
Belarusian population prior to the elections in 
September 2012. 
 
6.  A clear strategy for Belarus:  It is important 
to remember that the impact of EU policy in 
Belarus is likely to remain rather limited, 
taking into account the geopolitics and geo-
economics of Russia’s relations with the 
country (and with the EU), and the nature of 
the Belarusian regime. Nevertheless, the EU 
could still be more specific about the goals of 
its policy towards Belarus. Is the goal of the 
sanctions to ‘punish’ particular individuals for 
human rights violations, to ‘annoy 
Lukashenka’ or simply to signal that the EU ‘is 
doing something’ about autocratic regimes in 
its neighbourhood?39 And what is the goal of 
the policy in the longer term: Push Lukashenka 
to introduce reforms or regime change? There 
is no consensus among EU officials on the 
answers to questions which hinge upon 
fundamental discussions on whether political 
change in autocratic countries can occur from 
‘within’ or from ‘outside’, and the role that 
civil society can or should play in the process. 
The EU cannot solve this puzzle, but a clear 
strategy or vision for EU-Belarus relations 
could build on such a discussion.   
 
 
                                                 
38 The EU Strategic Framework and Action Plan on 
Human Rights and Democracy (Council of the EU, 25 
June 2012: 11855/12) foresees the systematic 
integration of human rights and democracy into ‘all 
aspects of the internal and external policies of the 
European Union’ (p.1). 
39 The goals were articulated by EU officials in interviews 
with the author in November/December 2011, Brussels. 
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